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Summary 
 
This report compares the design and procurement of the Work Programme (WP) 
with pertinent experience in Australia, the USA and the Netherlands. It considers the 
risks in the implementation of performance based contracts, their implications for the 
WP, and their address in the other countries. 
 
The review finds that contract and procurement systems in the comparator countries 
have been in flux as policy makers have sought to secure the advantages of 
contracting out whilst minimising attendant risks and delivery problems. Critics view 
such change and re-regulation as indicative of the inherent instability of contracting 
systems whilst proponents prefer the term ‘continuing improvement’.  
 
There are a number of key risks with performance and outcome based contracting, 
notably the practices of ‘creaming and parking’ and ‘gaming’. 
 
 ‘Cream-skimming’ occurs when providers select the more job ready or more 
motivated participants to help meet targets or gain outcomes instead of selecting 
those with the potential to gain more in the longer term. ‘Cream-skimming’ may 
become a reality in the wake of the initial surge of mandated participants into WP. 
With its uncapped budget and volunteer eligibility groups, the WP design may 
inadvertently induce this practice.  
 
‘Parking’ occurs after recruitment when providers may put less effort and investment 
into working with harder to place participants. Parking was a particular problem in the 
first two Australian Job Network contract periods.  Evaluations found that although 
participants were allocated to providers for a year most contact occurred in the first 
few months and many users received minimal services and saw their provider 
infrequently. It is possible to envisage a similar outcome in the WP should providers 
concentrate intensive service provision in the initial stages and maintain different 
levels of contact with participants thereafter. DWP maintains that the design of the 
WP will militate against this but critics have warned that ‘parking’ may occur amongst 
the harder to assist participants within the WP’s differential payment bands. 
 
‘Gaming’ occurs when providers seek to exploit weaknesses in programme design 
by undertaking activities which allow better performance on contractual criteria but 
do not improve employment outcomes.  At its most extreme ‘gaming’ may involve 
fraudulent activity.  The occurrence of ‘gaming’ in each of the comparator countries 
reinforces the importance of balancing WP flexibilities with safeguards, and robust 
risk assurance and audit processes. 
 
A further set of risks relate to ‘market failure’. The most obvious is that a severe 
‘economic shock’ might undermine provider viability. The Department suggests that 
WP contracts give providers scope to absorb most labour market fluctuations and 
there is a ‘change control’ mechanism that enables contractual variations in the 
event of unforeseen adverse developments. 
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Other, less dramatic, forms of market failure require that the DWP has sufficient 
safeguards to sanction large prime contractors for poor performance, remove 
contracts and/or replace an underperforming provider when contracts are due for 
renewal. It remains unclear how much risk the DWP has effectively transferred to 
prime providers and the Department’s capacity to tackle under performance and to 
resist attempts to renegotiate contractual terms is, as yet, untested. A potential long 
term consequence of the concentration and duration of WP contracts, however, is 
the accrued advantages of the incumbent primes and the lessening of the risk of 
potential loss of contract. In future, the DWP also may find it harder to attract new 
entrants to the market. It is important, then, that the continuing interest and potential 
competitive threat posed by other providers who have qualified for the ‘Framework’ is 
sustained rather than assumed. 
 
The explicit connection between up-front investment by WP providers, job outcome 
and long term sustainment payments, and funding from future benefit savings is 
distinctive to the British system. In Wisconsin welfare to work providers received 
some of the savings accrued from the reduced benefit expenditure they helped 
generate. The contract was poorly designed as providers gained income from simply 
reducing the benefit caseload. The outcome and evidence requirements for WP 
providers are more rigorous, but it remains important to monitor the number and 
destinations of WP referrals and participants who leave benefit but do not enter 
employment. 
 
In the comparator countries, there have been challenges around the definition, 
measurement and authentication of job outcomes. Evidential requirements should be 
robust but proportionate, seeking to limit the administrative burden that has 
characterised paper-based audit systems. The definition of a WP job outcome will 
need to be revised over the period of the contract to better align provider incentives 
with the Universal Credit which will encourage claimants to take ‘mini jobs’.  
 
WP prime contractors have specified the minimum services they intend to provide. 
They also are obliged to inform service users about the services they will make 
available. There are, however, few safeguards to ensure the delivery of services and 
the DWP will have only limited insight into the ‘black box’ of front line delivery. It is 
important that the safeguards are robust if Ministers and DWP are to resist possible 
future pressures to introduce the type of prescribed service standards that re-
bureaucratised the Australian Job Network. 
 
Service user journeys across mixed public and private provision can be complicated, 
especially for the most disadvantaged. In Australia, the Netherlands and the US 
problems have arisen with ‘failures to attend’, incorrect assessments, and the 
imposition of sanctions. Such risks may be heightened with the WP because of its 
duration, subcontractor delivery chains, and the requirement for participants to 
maintain regular contact with a private provider whilst continuing to ‘sign on’. Service 
users will need clear and timely information to avoid ‘mixed messages’ and it will be 
important to monitor trends in sanctions and the interactions on conditionality 
between Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and WP providers.  
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Other problems may arise from poor interactions between health assessments and 
job search and programme activity requirements. Lengthy waiting times and 
inaccurate assessments, with consequential appeals, have proved difficult to 
manage both in Australia and New York. The connections between JCP, Atos and 
WP providers should be tracked closely. Issues of concern may include the 
timeliness, reporting and accuracy of work capacity assessments, appeals 
processes, and the management of changing health status of individuals during WP 
participation.   
 
Comparative evidence confirms the importance of ensuring that robust systems are 
in place to respond to complaints of unfair treatment and poor service delivery. In 
Australia the Department has committed to clear minimum ‘Service Guarantees’ that 
apply to all providers. In the USA providers and welfare agencies must have 
complaints procedures in place to respond should services be unfairly denied to 
clients or of poor quality. The WP approach seems opaque in this regard, with 
individual prime contractors having their own minimum service standards, which may 
vary, and freedom in how they communicate their disputes and resolution 
procedures to participants. Prime providers must produce a document outlining their 
minimum services and the ‘first steps’ of their complaints procedures but it is unclear 
how the full range of safeguards are communicated to service users referred to the 
WP. In addition, there does not seem to be any mechanism for collating complaints 
information between JCP, prime contractors and DWP.   
 
Concerns have been expressed about prime providers’ management of their 
subcontractors and the contractual terms and risks passed on to smaller 
organisations. In response the DWP’s Commissioning Strategy established a ‘code 
of conduct’ and sponsored the ‘Merlin’ standard to ensure a role for voluntary sector 
and specialist organisations in WP delivery. The DWP, however, eschews any direct 
role in supply chain commercial relationships although these forces are most likely to 
drive change and possible consolidation. Over time it may be important to monitor 
the impact of WP contracting on the composition of the non-profit organisations 
involved as well as the quantity of referrals and terms and value of any contracts with 
primes.  
 
The accountability of WP providers is more limited than that of public sector 
organisations and whilst prime provider contracts have been published, information 
that was considered ‘commercially sensitive or confidential’ has been redacted and 
there is little public information available on subcontractor contracts. 
 
Contracting out of employment services poses challenges to political accountability. 
Ministers remain politically responsible for service outcomes and the effective use of 
public funds even though in practice they will have less control over the actions of 
WP contractors. There is much scope for ‘blame shifting’ and the responsibility for 
poor performance is less obvious. In each of the comparator countries audit and 
oversight bodies have played a significant role in holding policy makers and 
providers to account, prompting improvements in service delivery, and exposing poor 
practices. In this context the role of such bodies in Britain will be of particular 
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importance, especially as Ministers, senior officials and providers will have a clear 
interest in promoting the success of the WP. 
7 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) contracts with an extensive network 
of providers for the delivery of employment programmes. Over the past ten years 
there has been significant change culminating in the Freud Report (2007) and the 
Department’s Commissioning Strategy (2008). The new approach involves 
purchasing services from well-capitalised prime contractors capable of delivering 
multiple contracts across the country. Contracts are higher in value, last for up to 
seven years, and the payments to providers are to be funded from DWP programme 
allocations and the benefit savings generated by improvements in sustained 
employment. Smaller providers act mainly as subcontractors in more or less 
extensive supply chains. 35 potential prime contractors qualified as regional 
preferred suppliers on the ‘Framework for the Provision of Employment Related 
Support Services’ and 18 have been awarded 40 Work Programme (WP) prime 
contracts. They plan to work with just over 1,000 named subcontractors who will be 
delivering ‘end to end’ and/or specialist services. 
 
There is a broad consensus among officials, Ministers and large providers that the 
new service delivery system will be characterised by innovation, improved 
accountability, better job outcomes, greater value for money, and better customer 
service. These assumptions are justified both by reference to past British experience 
(for example, in Employment Zones) and to ‘international best practice’.  Indeed 
DWP has commissioned reviews and drawn lessons from the experience of other 
countries, especially that of Australia and the Netherlands, which the Freud Report 
described as “world leaders” (2007, p. 57).  
 
The National Audit Office commissioned this report to assess how the objectives, 
scope and design of the WP compare with international experience and to assess in 
what ways the British approach may be considered innovative. The review was also 
designed to consider insights, from overseas and British experience, on the risks that 
DWP should be seeking to manage through the lifetime of the WP contracts. 
 
The report reviews the contracting out of employment services in OECD countries 
and briefly assesses how contract design and procurement practices have changed 
in three international comparator countries most cited in shaping WP design, namely 
Australia, the USA and the Netherlands. The final sections consider the primary risks 
involved in the implementation of performance based contracts and their implications 
over the period of the WP contracts. 
 
2. Procuring employment services and payment by results contracting 
systems in the USA, Australia and the Netherlands 
 
In many countries Government Departments and public agencies have a long 
tradition of delivering employment services through grants or contracts with other 
public and non-profit organisations. Such networks often include various types of 
training institutions, which may have links with the social partners; providers of 
specialist services and facilities, for example, in vocational rehabilitation or sheltered 
employment; and large non-profits that deliver a wide range of social and 
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employment-related services. More recently there has been an increase in the 
delivery of employment services by for-profit organisations.1  
 
In individual OECD countries the commissioning and contracting of employment 
services is typically complex and, in many countries, small scale, with a wide variety 
of procurement practices (OECD, 2007). Contracted out activities typically include 
the delivery of conventional labour market programmes and more intensive forms of 
support targeted at disadvantaged groups, including specialist programmes for those 
with disabilities. Australia is the only OECD country to wholly outsource the delivery 
of publicly funded employment services. 
 
There are variations in the level of government and composition of the public 
agencies that procure employment services, with skills training often funded and 
purchased separately. Purchasers range from national Government Departments, as 
in GB and Australia, which apply a centralised contracting framework, through to 
decentralised and multi-purchaser systems, as in the Netherlands and Germany. In 
many countries, especially in Europe, local and regional offices of the public 
employment service procure services but they typically do so within a national 
framework of guidelines, contracts and predetermined services (OECD, 2007).  
 
Whilst systematic information is not available it appears that in many OECD 
countries purchasers procure specific services, typically specifying the detailed 
design of the particular employment intervention or training course to be delivered. 
The public body also determines the price to be paid and the terms of the contract. 
Contracts often are short-term with durations often of one year or less. Payment 
systems also vary from recurrent public funding, to grants, to staged payments or 
fees paid for services delivered.  
 
Payments for placing people into employment have been used less extensively. One 
reason is that in many countries subcontracted providers are not expected to, or may 
be prohibited from, assisting participants in their programmes with actual job 
placement. In several countries there is resistance to contracting out services with 
for-profit providers and regulatory barriers exist preventing such entities from 
competing for contracts. 
 
The increased involvement of private for-profit organisations correlates to changes in 
contracting regimes. In a number of countries contracting systems now are 
characterised by competitive tendering, the selection of employment service 
providers on the basis of price and quality, and the payment of providers based on 
their performance in delivering services and securing employment outcomes.  
 
Performance based contracting; including elements of payment for employment 
outcomes, was first developed in the USA and subsequently extended to the UK, 
Australia and the Netherlands. Other countries have more recently implemented or 
                                                 
1
 These for-profits include private employment agencies, such as Manpower, Randstad and Adecco, 
alongside a range of other companies that specialise in delivering employment services. This includes 
organisations now operating in several countries, such as A4e and Working Links from the UK, Calder 
from the Netherlands, Ingeus from Australia, and Maximus and Rescare from the USA. 
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are testing changes in their employment services contracts with several, such as 
Germany, France, Denmark ,Sweden, and Israel, experimenting with job outcome 
performance contracts and delivery through for-profit providers (Kaps, 2010; 
Behaghely et al, 2011; Bredgaard, 2010;  Bennmarker et al, 2009; OECD, 2010).  
 
The contracts in these countries are diverse but they variously combine 
commencement fees, specific service fees and milestone and outcome payments 
with prices either fixed in advance or agreed in the tender and contract negotiation 
period. Germany is also experimenting with financial penalties for providers who fail 
to meet performance expectations. Outcome measures vary but typically include job 
entry, sustained employment, indicators of employment quality and, in the USA, 
earnings gains. 
 
The WP shares many of these characteristics but is exceptional in terms of the 
proportion of funding wholly dependent on job outcomes, the length of time over 
which sustainment payments will be made and the size and duration of the contracts. 
Other innovative features include the stress placed on working with subcontractors 
and the design and purpose of contractually specified minimum performance 
standards. Such minimum standards exist in other countries, such as the USA, but it 
is only in Britain that they have been calculated in relation to prior benefit off-flows 
and established to underpin programme funding from future benefit savings. 
 
2.1 Performance Based Contracting and Prime Contractors in the USA  
 
The transition to performance based contracting in US training and employment 
services became extensive after implementation of the 1982 Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) (King and Barnow, 2011). This legislation devolved funding 
and purchasing power to states and through them to a national network of Private 
Industry Councils (PICs) and linked attainment in meeting explicit performance 
standards with financial incentives.2 These incentive systems were reflected in the 
contracts and payment systems between PICs and their subcontractors and by the 
end of the 1980s 80% of PICs were making at least some element of payment 
dependent on outcomes (Felstead, 1998).  
 
In time JTPA outcomes were amended to include placement in unsubsidised 
employment, retention for not less than six months in such employment, increased 
earnings, and skills acquisition - including basic skills and qualifications. These 
standards were consolidated in 1998 in the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) that 
replaced JTPA. The standards established under JTPA served also as the 
                                                 
2
 Training and Enterprise Councils (England and Wales) and Local Enterprise Companies (Scotland) 
were modelled on PICs. Between 1987 and 2001 these employer led entities were funded through 
performance based contracts with differential payments for special needs trainees and higher cost 
training. TECs were funded centrally but free to contract with local providers and to generate 
surpluses on their activities. The gradual introduction of greater payments for sustained job outcomes 
for adult unemployed trainees was associated initially with improved performance but when a full 
outcome based system was extended TEC providers were found to have been more selective in 
recruitment. TECs also became mired in controversies around ‘gaming’, duplicated and incorrect 
payments, inadequate supporting evidence for claims from some providers, and high level TEC 
reserves (Bennett et al, 1994). 
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‘prototype’ for their extension to other federal programmes, including the welfare to 
work programmes targeted at poor, usually lone parent families (Heinrich, 1999).  
 
Local ‘Workforce Investment Boards ‘ replaced PICs and currently some 575 WIBs 
are responsible for administering the WIA programmes in their area and for 
contracting with local organisations to provide services (Eberts, 2009). Most WIBs 
subcontract training programmes and the 1,300 ‘one stop’ centres or hubs through 
which services are delivered. The WIBs and their providers are held accountable for 
their performance against a combination of performance and process standards and 
failure to meet these standards may result in financial sanctions whilst high 
performance is rewarded.  
 
In many states the involvement of for-profit providers, especially in operating one-
stop centres, has been constrained by rules that limit spending on administrative 
costs and profits, with profits often ‘capped’ at between 6% and 8% of the overall 
budget. The aim has been to ensure that resources are targeted at service provision. 
Private providers argue, however, that the rules constrain innovation and investment 
with a reduction in the number of for-profit operators seeking to win contracts 
(Heaney, 2011). Most WIB provision and training programmes are delivered by 
public and non-profit entities. 
 
Surveys of welfare to work provision, funded through ‘Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families’, found that all states contracted out some services, equivalent to an 
average of about 15% of all their TANF expenditure (GAO, 2002). About a quarter of 
the market was allocated to for-profit providers, the rest to non-profits and public 
sector subcontractors. As with WIA, many states restrict the level of funds in 
contracts that may be allocated to administrative costs or taken as profits.  
 
An evidence review of welfare to work contracting distinguished between ‘fixed 
price’, ‘cost-reimbursement’ and ‘pure pay-for-performance’ contracts. In practice 
states used ‘hybrid contracts’ seeking to establish a balance between performance 
incentives, provider viability, and the delivery of particular services and outcomes. 
Even in the locality with the highest proportion of ‘pay-for-performance’ contractor 
viability was underpinned by a fixed monthly payment of 15% to 25% of their 
budgets, irrespective of their performance (McConnell et al, 2003, p.xxii).  
 
Studies of US welfare to work contracting found that there had been much ‘learning 
by doing’ and many administrative and delivery problems had to be managed in the 
early contract periods (McConnell et al, 2003; Bryna Sanger, 2003). In Wisconsin, for 
example, poor contract design created perverse incentives for providers and was 
further marred by malpractices amongst some of those employed by contractors 
(see Figure 1). There have since been improvements in contract design and 
implementation but there remains a wariness in many states about the involvement 
of for-profit organisations in the delivery of welfare to work services. 
 
In most parts of the USA the proportion of provider income dependent on 
employment outcomes tends to be relatively low, ranging between 10% and 20%. 
The key incentives in the US system concern the requirement that service providers 
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meet a range of performance and outcome standards to remain eligible for funds or 
face the risk that a purchaser will choose not to renew a contract or put it out to 
competitive tender in an environment where annual contracts or renewals are the 
norm (SPR, 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Poor Contract Design in Wisconsin 
 
The first welfare to work contract used in Wisconsin (1998-99) was “an example of the 
potential for serious unintended incentives” (McConnell et al, 2003, p.48). The contracts 
were cost-reimbursement but included a bonus that depended on the difference between 
actual costs and a specified maximum. If costs exceeded the maximum, the difference was 
the responsibility of the provider. If the provider spent less than the cap, however, it received 
a portion of the savings. Critics of the contract argued that it gave contractors the incentive 
to not serve clients or serve them less intensely. The contract generated substantial 
controversy when large caseload reductions in Wisconsin resulted in significant windfall 
profits for the providers - in one case, more than US$9 million. There was lax control also of 
the expenditure that did take place and of how contractors were operating (one was 
estimated to have spent US$1.1 million on a marketing campaign) and several private 
agencies were also found to have been engaged in financial mismanagement and 
irregularities (LAB, 2005; DeParle, 2004). 
 
The criticisms of the contract led the state to completely overhaul its bonus provisions. From 
2000 contract incentive payments have been limited to the achievement of specified 
performance measures rather than unspent funds. Under these cost-reimbursement 
contracts 80% is paid during the programme with 20% retained for performance bonuses 
paid at the end of contract term. An agency is granted a ‘Right of First Selection’ if it meets 
minimum standards. It is paid restricted bonuses (which must be reinvested in purposes 
consistent with TANF) for reaching intermediate performance levels and unrestricted 
bonuses, that it can take as profit, are paid only when the highest performance levels are 
attained. 
 
2.2 The prime contractor model and payment by results in New York City 
 
New York City (NYC) has been of comparative interest to DWP because it has made 
use of a prime contracting delivery model and awards some of the highest value 
welfare to work contracts in the USA. 
 
The city’s ‘Human Resource Administration’ (HRA) is responsible for delivering 
’public assistance’ cash payments and referring all eligible applicants to mandatory 
contracted out employment programmes via its network of local Job Centers.   
 
After a period of testing the city rolled out a prime contractor delivery model in 2000 
(Savas, 2005). The approach was chosen explicitly to reduce administrative costs 
and the high number of low value contracts that the city previously awarded to 
multiple small non-profit organisations. The system was introduced alongside 
‘Vendorstat’, a performance management system that allowed HRA to verify job 
placements and other milestones recorded by providers and release payments.  
Monitoring was reduced to the verification of placements and job retention by 
quarterly audits of a sample of prime contractor cases, with follow up work only 
where discrepancies occurred. In effect HRA allowed prime contractors to play “the 
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role of monitor” (Bryna Sanger, 2003, p.40). The city auditor continues to monitor 
payment evidence trails and has, on several occasions, criticised HRA and prime 
contractors about a “lack of consistent documentation on employment, work hours 
and wages” (OC CNY, 2008; 2007). 
 
In 2006, there was a major change in NYC provision with the creation of a single 
‘Back to Work’ programme delivered by eight prime contractors. Each public Job 
Center works now with only one prime contractor who is expected to provide 
customised and flexible employment and work experience services and work with a 
service user ‘from start to finish’. The contractor must develop a ‘Job Retention and 
Career Plan’ for each participant to document their efforts to ‘advance’ the individual 
through skill development and financial planning. Much of the providers funding 
depends on job entry, retention and wage gain, with additional incentive payments 
targeted at participants who may have been sanctioned. Job outcome payments are 
paid after 90 days and 180 days of sustained employment. 
 
There is a separate stream of provision for those with multiple employment barriers 
which was remodelled as ‘WeCARE’ in 2005. WeCARE is delivered through two 
prime providers and their subcontractors. Two-thirds of the prime contractors’ 
potential income is performance-based and milestone-driven; a third is paid for 
services claimed on a monthly basis. This payment system reflects the greater 
barriers faced by the client group, but remains performance-driven with significant 
payments for sustained employment outcomes (Kasdan and Youdelman, 2007). 
 
The NYC prime contracting model has experienced political criticism, been 
challenged through the courts, and subcontractors have complained about their 
treatment. Much of the criticism was experienced in the period of transition when 
providers lost contracts or were relegated to subcontractor status (Biberman, 2001).  
The criticisms of prime contractors echo some of the points made by non-profit 
providers in Britain. For example, there were complaints from non-profit 
subcontractors about delayed payments and overly complex requirements that were 
“as excessive and costly as when they reported directly to the city” (Bryna Sanger, 
2003, p.69). Other subcontractors complained that prime contractors ‘skimmed off’ 
the most work ready clients, had ‘top sliced’ an overhead charge, and had passed 
most risk to them (Youdelman and Getsos, 2005). In contrast, other subcontractors 
have stressed that they had been able to access large contracts they could not bid 
for on their own. They had also benefited from the economies of scale, performance 
management systems and additional supports that prime contractors could deploy 
(Armstrong et al, 2009). 
 
2.3 The Australian Job Network and Job Services Australia 
 
In 1998 the Australian Government created the ‘Job Network’ (JN), a fully 
subcontracted employment placement market. Conventional programmes were 
replaced by ‘employment assistance’, where less prescriptive contracts gave 
providers flexibility to decide individual service provision within a system made up of 
commencement fees and job outcome payments (Considine, 2001).  
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The federal Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
(DEEWR) has been responsible for designing contracts, selecting successful 
providers, and subsequently managing contract performance and service delivery. 
Before finalising the design of each contract the Department would typically consult 
with providers and other stakeholders on the proposed terms and significant policy 
changes. It would then issue a tender document inviting providers to submit bids. 
Submissions were assessed by federal civil servants with contracts awarded for 
three year periods. 
 
Unemployed jobseekers entre the employment services system via ‘Centrelink. This 
is a public sector agency that remains responsible for paying benefits, assessing 
eligibility and imposing sanctions. At the initial claim stage Centrelink officials 
administer a ‘Job Seeker Classification Instrument’ (JSCI) that assesses barriers and 
likelihood of long term unemployment. The results are used to allocate job seekers to 
various services with the most expensive targeted at those assessed as hardest to 
place. 
 
JN contractors secured tenders to deliver services in designated areas where they 
would typically compete with two to five other providers, giving unemployed people 
(and employers) a choice of provider. One consequence is that JN ‘sites’ are 
typically small with most having between 1 and 12 staff and very few with more than 
20 (DEWR, 2006).  
 
JN contractors were allocated a market share but were not guaranteed a particular 
number of referrals or clients. Market share allocation could be varied during the 
course of a contract depending on how well the provider performed, reflected in their 
‘star rating’. The ratings assess relative performance in job placements and are 
released on a six monthly basis. Star ratings are intended also to enable jobseekers 
and employers to make an informed choice about which provider to be referred to or 
place vacancies with.3 
 
The design of the early JN payment system was criticised when it was found that it 
had encouraged ‘parking’ and that high level initial ‘commencement’ fees enabled 
providers to make profits with low levels of job entry. There was a radical change in 
the third contract where price competition was dropped and ‘one-off’ commencement 
fees were replaced by specific service fees and a ‘Job Seeker Account’. The account 
comprised a restricted pool of funds earmarked for spending only on employment 
barrier reduction.  
 
The JN payment system now comprised specific service and job placement fees, the 
Job Seeker Account, and outcome payments for employment sustained for 13 and 
26 weeks. A breakdown of JN expenditure for 2006-07 showed that more provider 
income now depended on job outcomes. Of just over A$1 billion paid to providers 
about 38% was for service fees, 15% for Job Seeker Accounts, 10% for job 
placement fees and 36% for job outcome payments (ANAO, 2008, Tables 1.1, 1.2). 
                                                 
3
 DWP experimented with a star rating system and jobseeker choice in Employment Zones and both 
innovations were planned to be integral to the Flexible New Deal. Both these design features appear 
to have been dropped in the WP. 
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In 1997 over 1,000 organisations had submitted tenders from which 306 core JN 
Members were selected. By 2007 the number of core providers had fallen to 99 
delivering services from over 1000 sites in 137 ‘Employment Service Areas’. The 
reduction in the number of providers at successive tendering rounds was associated 
with an increase in performance, with a smaller number of better managed agencies 
delivering improved service strategies (Grubb, 2006). Improvements were attributed 
also to the pressure generated by star ratings and the reinforcement of the pay-for-
performance contracting regime following the reduction in commencement fee 
income. 
 
By 2009 the network of JN providers was comprised of generalist and specialist 
organisations, with about 60% of market share controlled by 13 larger generalist 
providers, with five of those responsible for nearly 40% of delivery. The market has 
been shared almost equally between for-profit and non-profit agencies. There were 
other separately procured specialist employment programmes for the disabled and 
for job seekers with multiple employment barriers. These were mostly delivered by 
non-profits. 
 
In 2009, the JN was reformed into ‘Job Services Australia’ (JSA). The new system 
integrated core JN employment assistance services with previously separate 
specialist provision for the hardest to help and for those seeking to start small 
enterprises. There remains a separate ‘Disability Employment Network’ (DEN). One 
important change was that in the new system the earlier recruitment caps on the 
specialist and disability programmes were removed. Unlike Britain, however, this 
change has not been funded from, or linked explicitly to, future savings in benefit 
payments. 
 
In the JSA system job seekers are categorised into one of four ‘streams’, with the 
most job ready referred to stream 1 and those with ‘severe barriers’ referred to 
stream 4. On commencement a JSA provider is required to develop an individually 
tailored ‘Employment Pathway Plan’ (EPP) for each service user which maps out any 
training, work experience or additional assistance the individual might need to find 
sustainable employment. The payment system comprises service fees paid during 
participation, access to an ‘Employment Pathway Fund’ to purchase services for the 
jobseeker, and job placement and outcome payments paid after evidence of 13 
weeks or 26 weeks employment retention. The level of resource per participant, and 
outcome incentive for the provider, increases in relation to duration of unemployment 
and the severity of the barriers faced, as indicated by the service stream to which the 
participant is referred. 
 
Relationships between DEEWR and providers had become more fractious over the 
period of the JN with the new contracting approach including a ‘Charter of Contract 
Management’. The Charter sits alongside the formal legal contract and sets out 
minimum standards of performance and conduct that providers can expect of 
DEEWR with a procedure for how any disputes should be resolved. There is also a 
provider Code of Practice that sets the ethical framework and principles which guide 
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how providers deliver quality services and which underpins the ‘service guarantees’ 
given to jobseekers setting out the minimum service standards they can expect.  
 
A renewed ‘Performance Management Framework’ continues to comprise of three 
Key Performance Indicators.  KPI1 measures efficiency, defined as the time taken to 
achieve an employment outcome for a job seeker and KPI2 measures effectiveness 
in achieving outcomes in a certain stream compared with the results of other 
providers. The third KPI measures quality and is assessed separately by DEEWR 
contract managers. The quality KPI3 includes regular assessment of ‘organisational 
health’ and ‘stakeholder engagement’, but the primary emphasis is on service 
delivery, seeking ‘to maximise the delivery of high quality, individualised employment 
services’. The assessment includes also a review of complaints from jobseekers and 
of provider responsiveness to them.   
 
The performance system is underpinned by a centralised DEEWR computer system 
which has evolved from the inception of the JN. The ‘Employment Services System’ 
is used for recording all provider interactions with job seekers; for claiming service 
fees, EPF and job outcome payments; and for monitoring and regulating job seeker 
flows to providers. The system exchanges and updates job seeker information 
between providers and Centrelink including notifications of when any sanctions 
action should be taken. Providers complain that the reporting and information system 
is too prescriptive but the level of data that is generated gives officials detailed 
insight into the delivery system. 
 
2.4 The Netherlands Reintegration market 
 
Until recently the Netherlands had gone furthest among European countries in 
developing the role of private providers. The Dutch system is now comprised of a 
variety of ‘purchasers’, including private employers, with a multiplicity of providers, 
including many ‘micro’ organisations that deliver voucher-type services to a small 
number of participants. The two significant public purchasers are the Institute for 
Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV), which is responsible for the social insurance 
system, and the network of over 400 municipalities who can choose to subcontract 
the delivery of employment services for people receiving social assistance.  
 
Over a ten year period the UWV, the largest sole purchaser, successively adapted 
its tender system as it sought to improve the efficiency of its contracted provision, 
personalise support and target intensive services at harder to help participants.  
 
Between 2002 and 2008 the UWV organised some sixteen ‘tender rounds’. Tender 
selection was undertaken by regional officials and the criteria varied according to the 
needs of particular groups with greater stress on the professional competence of 
contractors, rather than price, for those selected to work with more disadvantaged 
groups. Once the contract commenced the provider could recruit a participant for up 
to a year and delivery of a complete ‘reintegration trajectory’ could take up to two 
years. The number of newly assigned participants in subcontracted programmes fell 
from about 105,000 in 2002 to about 67,000 in 2003, falling further to 23,000 in 2005 
(Koning and Heinreich, 2010, p. 12). 
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The initial tendering system involved relatively small contracts designed to tackle the 
barriers of particular groups of unemployed and disabled people with prices and 
outcome payment terms differentiated according to distance from the labour market. 
The contracts were typically ‘no cure, less pay’, allocating between10% and 20% of 
the price on completion of an agreed action plan, a fixed payment of about 40% six 
months after commencement and another 40% or 50% after placement in a job for 
two months, with a minimum six month contract (Sol, 2008, p. 77). Subsequently the 
UWV placed greater emphasis on cost reduction and  the share of pure payment by 
results ‘no cure, no pay’ contracts increased from close to zero in 2002 to more than 
half of the contracts let in 2005 (Koning and Heinreich, 2010, p.13). 
 
The UWV emphasis on price competition ensured a reduction in the average cost 
per contracted trajectory that had fallen to between €2,800 and €3,500 by 2007 
(Finn, 2008, p.33).  Providers and others argued that the fall in prices and focus on 
short term results to secure outcome payments had a negative impact on the quality 
of trajectories as providers removed costly service elements, especially longer term 
training (de Koning, 2007).  
 
In response to criticism about the standardisation of reintegration services and the 
lack of choice available the UWV introduced ‘IROs’ (Individual Re-integration 
Agreements) from January 2004 (see Figure 2). These individual vouchers were 
popular and, within months, more users were opting for IROs than were participating 
in tendered provision. The IRO led to an influx of ‘micro’ providers, and the number 
of companies with whom the UWV contracted increased rapidly from less than 100 in 
2003 to 1,960 by late 2007. The provider registration requirements were minimal and 
there was concern about the quality of provision.  
 
Figure 2: Individual Reintegration Agreements (IROs) 
 
IROs allow eligible service users to negotiate an individual plan with a provider of their 
choice, subject to agreement with the UWV who subsequently enter into a contract with the 
provider. An IRO trajectory may last for up to two years and the normal maximum price was 
€5,000 (now reduced to €4,000). For users with more significant barriers the price could be 
up to €7,500 (now reduced to €5,000). The contract had a ‘no cure, less pay’ funding formula 
with the provider paid 20% at the start of an agreed plan, 30% after six months participation 
with 50% of the agreed fee payable for sustained employment.  
 
These developments led to a major overhaul of the UWV contracting system with the 
introduction in April 2008 of a ‘purchase framework’ (Sol, 2008). Under the 
framework agreement providers had to meet specified process and performance 
requirements to be placed on a UWV ‘approved list’. The framework comprised a 
smaller number of providers who committed to deliver a range of ‘call off’ services 
most of which were fixed price, with only job search and placement being dependent 
on outcomes. The new system gave public sector case managers greater control 
and the ‘modular buying strategy’ facilitated shorter duration interventions whose 
results were easier to monitor and measure. 
 
17 
 
The Netherlands will undergo radical change from 2012 prompted by major 
reductions in the budgets of the UWV and municipalities. From January some 90% 
of unemployed jobseekers will only have access to e-services, with face-to-face 
services restricted to the hardest to place and long term unemployed. The UWV will 
have no budget for purchasing reintegration services for the unemployed, although it 
retains a budget to commission some IROs for those on disability benefits. The 
impact of these changes on providers is not yet clear but the Dutch reintegration 
market is shrinking rapidly.  
 
3. Contracting out employment services: risks and lessons for the WP 
 
The reviews of comparator countries show significant differences in contract design 
and procurement and that in each country contracting systems have been in flux.  In 
each country policy makers have been, as in Britain, seeking to develop 
procurement and contracting systems that best secure the advantages of contracting 
out whilst minimising the risks and disadvantages associated with it. Critics see such 
change and re-regulation as an indication of the inherent instability of contracting 
systems; proponents regard it as part of a process of ‘continuing improvement’.  
 
The following sections consider what has been learned from these experiences and 
their implications for the delivery of the WP. 
 
3.1 ‘Creaming and Parking’ in outsourced employment services 
 
There are a number of important risks associated with performance and outcome 
based contracting. The most frequently cited concern ‘creaming and parking’. 
 
The first factor is ‘cream-skimming’ or ‘cherry picking’, where providers select more 
job ready or more easily trained participants to enable the meeting of targets rather 
than selecting those who might gain more in the longer term (Struyven and Steurs, 
2005). This is a particular risk in voluntary programmes or when the group eligible for 
a service exceeds the number of available places and/or when providers can choose 
whom to admit to a service. ‘Cream-skimming’ has been encountered in the delivery 
of British training programmes and DWP employment programmes, and an early 
study of subcontractors delivering European Social Fund provision reports 
complaints of such practices (Crisp et al, 2010).  
 
After the initial surge of mandated participants has entered the WP ‘cream-skimming’ 
may become a factor. The WP design combines an uncapped budget with eligibility 
groups who may volunteer to participate and whom private providers may choose to 
target. US evaluations indicate the importance of monitoring for such developments. 
The extensive ‘cherry picking’ associated with JTPA provision was only reduced over 
time as policy makers and programme administrators were able to refine 
performance standards and measurement (Heinrich and Marscke, 2008).   
 
The second factor concerns creaming and parking that occurs after commencement. 
The evidence suggests that providers may, deliberately, or unintentionally through 
segmentation, concentrate efforts on those participants perceived as more likely to 
18 
 
be placed in employment. Participants with greater barriers may receive less 
effective or costly services and make little progress in a programme.  
 
 ‘Parking’ was a particular problem in the delivery of the Australian JN in the first two 
contract periods. The most expensive provision was ‘Intensive Assistance’ (IA), 
targeted at the long term unemployed, and after agreeing an individual action plan 
the contract gave considerable freedom to providers to deliver services as they saw 
fit. A Departmental evaluation found that although IA participants were allocated to 
providers for a year most contact with case managers took place in the first two 
months. An OECD evaluation reported that less than half of IA participants “had 
been sent to a job interview or to speak with an employer about a job”; nearly a 
quarter of those surveyed had “visited their provider only once or twice”; and “few 
providers appeared to be offering effective services to address the underlying 
barriers to employment” of the hardest to place (OECD 2001, p.193 and p. 59). One 
of the factors was that providers were deriving 70% of their income from the “high 
level of commencement fees” and had little incentive “to achieve additional 
outcomes” (PC, 2002, p. xxxiv). In the subsequent 2003 contract the ring fenced 
Jobseeker Account was introduced, the duration of IA was reduced to six months 
and the contract specified the sequence and duration of interviews that had to take 
place between case managers and service users.  
 
The Australian findings have relevance for the WP, where individual participation 
may last for up to two years and ‘black box’ contracting gives providers enhanced 
flexibility. It is possible to envisage an outcome similar to that in Australia where 
providers may concentrate intensive service provision during the initial stages and 
towards the end of the process, with little contact in between. DWP maintains that 
the design of the WP will militate against this because of differential pricing, geared 
to the more difficult to place groups, and because providers will get little income 
unless they place participants in sustained employment. The Work and Pensions 
Select Committee has, however, warned that ‘parking’ may occur amongst the 
clients who are harder to assist within broad WP payment bands (WPSC, 2011).4 
 
3.2 ‘Gaming’  
 
Another risk attached to the WP concerns ‘gaming’ where providers may seek to 
exploit weaknesses in programme design by undertaking activities which allow better 
performance on contractual criteria but which do not improve employment outcomes 
(Cumming, 2011; Koning and Heinreich, 2010). Such practices were found in US 
programmes. JTPA providers, for example, could influence performance results by 
managing when they recorded individual enrolments and/or programme completions 
(King and Barnow, 2011). In Australia some providers were said to be able to 
                                                 
4
 The WP differential price banding system will be affected by the introduction of Universal Credit.  
Future entrants to the WP will be on the same benefit but they are likely to be a more diverse 
population. It may be necessary for DWP to develop a classification instrument that will identify the 
hardest to place and to whom differential prices can be attached. Such classification systems can 
provide a relatively robust way of targeting resources but may be poorly designed, as in the 
Netherlands, and/or take a long time to develop, as occurred in Australia.  
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influence star ratings by using their funds to purchase uneconomic job outcomes at 
specific points in reporting periods (Murray, 2006). 
 
At its most extreme ‘gaming’ may involve fraudulent activity where providers, or their 
employees, may seek, for example, to falsify evidence of job outcomes and/or 
training qualifications.  Such episodes have occurred in each of the comparator 
countries although there are now stronger audit requirements in each and no strong 
evidence to suggest that such practices have been endemic.  
 
DWP risk assurance safeguards and processes were reviewed by the Work and 
Pensions Select Committee in 2010. The Committee accepted that detected and 
undetected fraud in British contracted employment programmes was low but called 
for DWP vigilance, especially in the context of the transition to prime contractors and 
the increased emphasis on ‘off benefit’ checks to validate job outcome payments. 
The Committee recommended that where providers risk assurance systems failed 
and their staff or subcontractors engaged in fraudulent practices there should be 
greater financial penalties. They proposed also that the reports of the ‘Risk 
Assurance Division’, which investigate such cases, should be made public, and there 
should be greater sharing of information between Government Departments that 
might contract with providers involved in such cases. 
 
3.3 Market failure 
 
A further set of risks concern ‘market failure’. The most obvious risk is that a severe 
‘economic shock’ either nationally or regionally might undermine provider viability, 
especially with funding so dependent on job placement and retention. The 
Department suggests that the geographical coverage and length of WP contracts 
gives providers scope to absorb most labour market fluctuations. There exists also a 
contractual ‘change control’ mechanism that enables DWP to have discussions and 
negotiate contract variations with providers in the event of significant 
unforeseendevelopments. 
 
There are other, less dramatic, forms of market failure. Market  forces may fail if the 
public purchaser is unable to entice a suitable pool of potential providers who will 
genuinely compete with each other on the basis of quality and/or price. Market forces 
would be weakened also if one or several providers dominated provision and the 
public purchaser was not in a position to sanction them for poor performance, 
remove contracts or replace the provider when contracts came up for renewal. Such 
concerns have been expressed about the powerful position over purchasers enjoyed 
by some large providers in the USA, whilst in other countries, such as Germany, the 
poor value and design of some contracts meant that 60% of tenders in one year 
received a solitary bid from all potential providers(Bryna-Sanger, 2003; Schneider, 
2008).  
 
The issue of a provider being ‘too big to fail’ may be significant in the WP where four 
out of eighteen prime contractors have been awarded over half of provision, and two 
of these account for  more than a third of the total. DWP attributes this outcome to 
the relative strength of the bids submitted and emphasises that the providers have 
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been assessed as having the capacity to deliver their commitments. The Department 
stresses that in each delivery area these providers face competition from at least one 
other prime contractor and where a provider clearly performs below their 
competitor(s) then they will lose referrals and market share (from mid-2013). DWP 
stresses also that if a provider fails to meet their agreed minimum performance 
levels they face losing the contract. 
 
It is not yet clear how much risk DWP has effectively transferred to prime providers 
and the Department’s capacity to tackle under performance and to resist attempts to 
renegotiate contractual terms will only be tested over time. However, one possible 
long term consequence of the concentration and duration of WP contracts is the 
acquired advantages enjoyed by incumbent primes and the lessening of the risk of 
potential loss of contract. In future, DWP may also find it more difficult to attract new 
entrants to the market and will face a difficult trade-off between the potential 
improvements that might be gained from a new prime contractor and the transaction 
costs and service delivery disruption that could arise in making such a transition. 
 
DWP cites the competitive threat posed by the other potential prime providers who 
have qualified for the ‘Framework’ and who in the case of contractual non-
compliance could be invited to replace an incumbent provider. The continuing 
interest of these providers should be sustained not assumed as it is not immediately 
apparent that these potential alternative providers will stay in the market and ‘merger 
and acquisition’ activity may diminish their number. One ‘unsuccessful’ Framework 
provider has already acquired a successful prime provider and another Framework 
provider has publicly indicated its withdrawal and lack of interest in future contracts. 
 
3.4 Financing employment programmes from benefit savings and the design of 
outcome payments 
 
The explicit connection between up-front investment by WP providers, job outcome 
and long term sustainment payments, and funding from future benefit savings is a 
distinctive feature of the British system. There are some comparators, such as, the 
Netherlands ‘Work and Income Fund’.5 In some US states and in Israel welfare to 
work providers have been paid a proportion of the savings accrued from any 
reductions in benefit expenditure they help generate. These particular contracts were 
undermined by poor design as providers were initially able to gain income from 
simply reducing the benefit caseload and preventing new applications rather than 
from showing that participants were placed in employment. The outcome and 
evidence requirements for WP providers to gain payment are better designed, but it 
                                                 
5
 In the Netherlands the Dutch Government funds municipalities through a ‘Fund for Work and 
Income’. It has two components. The ‘income fund’ pays for means tested social assistance and is 
determined on the basis of economic and social indicators. A separate flexible ‘work fund’ is designed 
to pay for employment or reintegration services and can be used only to pay for such services. Any 
surplus in the ‘work fund’ is returned to the Ministry. By contrast if the municipality pays less than it is 
allocated in the ‘income fund’ it can use the surplus as it sees fit. The risk is that if it overspends on 
benefits it has to subsidise these payments from its own resources. The municipality thus has a 
powerful incentive to reduce the number of people claiming social assistance and many have done so 
through the introduction of what are called ‘Work First’ programmes. 
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will still be important to monitor the number and destinations of WP referrals and 
participants who leave benefit but who do not enter employment. 
 
In comparative systems there have been challenges around how job outcomes are 
defined, measured and authenticated. Evidential requirements should be robust but 
proportionate, seeking to limit the administrative burden that has characterised 
paper-based audit requirements. 
 
The definition of a WP job outcome will also need to be revised over the period of the 
contract. Currently a job outcome payment will be made when a participant is in 
employment and  wholly ‘off’ an out of work benefit for the required period, which will 
normally mean at least a weekly minimum of 16 hours employment. The WP contract 
has already signalled to providers that revision will be needed to better align provider 
incentives with the Universal Credit that is designed to incentivise the progression 
from dependency to ‘mini jobs’. Such outcomes are rewarded in other systems, as in 
Australia, where providers are paid partial outcome payments if they place 
participants in ‘mini jobs’ or if they enable young people to enter full time education 
or training, so long as the individual’s benefit entitlement is significantly reduced.  
 
3.5 Monitoring the quality of service user experience 
 
WP prime contractors have specified the minimum services they intend to provide 
and have published them. They are also under an obligation to inform service users 
about the services they will make available. There are, however, only limited 
safeguards to ensure that the services are delivered and DWP will have only limited 
insight into the ‘black box’ of front line delivery. It is important that the safeguards are 
robust if Ministers and DWP are to be in a position to resist possible future pressures 
to introduce the type of prescribed service standards that re-bureaucratised the 
Australian JN. 
 
One important safeguard concerns the role of DWP contract managers but there is 
little public clarity about how they will discharge their roles or hold providers and 
subcontractors to account. There are virtues in diversity but there are service 
standards that should be common across all WP provision. Factors that could be 
assessed might include caseload size, frequency of job seeker contact, location and 
coverage of service delivery sites, and so on. Particular consideration could be given 
to the delivery of plans with a common performance indicator monitoring the plans’ 
quality, how detailed they are, how long they take to complete, and the extent to 
which they are personalised to the individual. Contract managers could monitor also 
how well providers meet the frequency of attendances they agree with participants. 
 
Another safeguard cited by DWP concerns the role of JCP which will be in a position 
to get feedback from participants about the quality of service they are receiving. 
Although unemployed JSA claimants will continue to sign on fortnightly whilst 
participating in the WP it is not clear that JCP assistant advisors, who take fortnightly 
reports, will have the time, or inclination, to monitor the quality of WP provision. This 
safeguard will also not apply to ESA claimants who are not required to ‘sign on’ 
fortnightly and who, arguably, may be more at risk of being ‘parked’. 
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Another way in which DWP might consider generating consistent insight into WP 
service user experience over the life of the contract is through ‘customer satisfaction 
surveys’, as used in public agencies, like JCP, and in contracted out provision in 
comparator countries. In Australia DEEWR commissions independent surveys of 
jobseeker and employer experience on a regular basis and the results are used in 
performance management. In the USA many welfare agencies supplement their 
limited on-site monitoring with customer satisfaction surveys. Some states carry out 
surveys of individuals who declined services or were sanctioned. The findings from 
such regular surveys provide important information on service delivery and the 
feedback they generate may discourage ‘parking’.  
 
3.6 Service user journeys and the interaction between JCP and WP providers 
 
Service user journeys across mixed public and private provision can be complicated, 
especially for the most disadvantaged. In Australia, the Netherlands and US systems 
clients can be required to make various transitions between different service 
providers and to satisfy their various requirements. Many may find these transitions 
smooth but in comparator countries there have been problems with ‘failures to 
attend’, incorrect assessments, and the imposition of sanctions, including variations 
in how different types of providers handle and report non-compliance with job search 
requirements. There have been problems also with the flow and sometimes accuracy 
of information and data exchanged between the respective agencies. These 
transactional problems were exacerbated in NYC and Australia by complex benefit 
regulations and activation requirements and the limited knowledge that provider staff 
have of such rules. 
 
Transitions between JCP and private providers are well established in British 
provision, although they may not always work smoothly. There may be increased 
risks associated with the WP because of its duration, subcontractor delivery chains, 
and the requirement for regular contact with a private provider whilst continuing to 
‘sign on’ fortnightly with JCP. This might be exacerbated further by the overlapping 
responsibilities of JCP and providers both of whom may seek to pursue different 
approaches to employment assistance and relevant activities. For example, JCP 
performance targets, which have no measure of sustainability, promote a ‘work first’ 
approach whereas a WP provider may take a longer view with less emphasis on the 
speed of an initial job placement. It might be useful for DWP to anticipate any 
problem and clarify the status of the job search and work activity requirements 
included in a WP Action Plan, agreed with a provider, and how this relates to 
immediate job search and availability requirements contained in the Jobseekers 
Agreement.   
 
Service users will need clear and timely information to avoid ‘mixed messages’ and it 
will be important to monitor trends in sanctions and the interactions on conditionality 
between JCP and WP providers. Poor sanction design and implementation has led 
to delivery problems in both NYC and Australia where, at particular points, a high 
proportion of claimants have been sanctioned and/or been embroiled in formal fair 
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hearing and appeal proceedings during which time they were less connected with 
provider services.  
 
Evaluations suggest that contracted providers and front line staff may exercise more 
discretion about who and when to report infractions to benefit authorities than public 
agencies. This may be because a case manager does not want to damage their 
relationship with a client. It may also be because of the administrative time 
consumed in reporting a breach and preparing the necessary documentation and the 
uncertain nature of any outcome. Such variation may blunt conditionality. The 
Australian experience suggests it may be worth considering specialist teams of JCP 
staff and decision makers who could ensure speedy communication with providers 
on compliance and sanction referrals, with feedback on the reasons for revoking 
referrals.6  
 
Other problems may arise from poor interactions between health assessments and 
job search and programme activity requirements. Lengthy waiting times and 
inaccurate assessments, with consequential appeals, have at times proved difficult 
to manage both in Australia and NYC, and the problems grew in significance as 
participation requirements were extended to clients with more significant health 
problems. The problems encountered in the interactions between the Pathways 
Programme and ESA assessments suggest that connections between JCP, Atos 
and WP providers should be tracked closely. Issues of concern may include the 
timeliness and accuracy of work capacity assessments, appeals processes, the 
communication of results and how changes in the health circumstances of 
individuals during WP participation are managed.   
 
3.7 Complaints and fair treatment for service users 
 
Comparative evidence confirms the importance of ensuring that robust systems are 
in place to respond to complaints of unfair treatment and poor service delivery. In 
Australia the Department has committed to clear minimum ‘Service Guarantees’ that 
apply to all providers. The ‘guaranteed’ service standards must be displayed in each 
delivery site, with information on how participants may make complaints, with 
providers also required to keep a complaints register. Disputes and complaints 
should be resolved first with the provider but the system includes final recourse to an 
independent complaints telephone line operated by DEEWR. Contract managers 
monitor the delivery of the guarantees and how speedily and well providers respond 
to complaints. 
 
In the USA providers and welfare agencies themselves are generally required to 
have complaints procedures in place to respond if services are unfairly denied to 
clients or those received are of poor quality. As problems have emerged new client-
focused requirements and procedures have been introduced. In Wisconsin, for 
                                                 
6
 The future significance of compliance interactions between JCP and WP providers may be gauged 
by staffing numbers in Australia. The public agency Centrelink has 500 staff organised in 
‘Participation Support Teams’ to manage the compliance system and facilitate the speedy resolution 
of ‘participation reports’ and communication with providers. In contrast DEEWR employs some 200 
account and contract managers to manage and monitor all the providers it contracts with. 
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example, clients must now be informed at the point of entry of the services available 
so that they are able to make an ‘informed choice’, and contractors can be fined 
US$5,000 per incident for ‘failing to serve’ a recipient or welfare applicant. The state 
Department also introduced an independent Ombudsperson to more ‘rapidly 
address’ complaints from individuals who have problems in accessing welfare to 
work services. Other states introduced ‘hotlines’ to more speedily respond to 
complaints and inquiries (McConnell, 2003). 
 
The WP approach seems more opaque, with individual prime contractors having 
their own minimum service standards, which may vary, and freedom in how they 
communicate their own disputes and resolution procedures to participants. The 
process is further complicated by the dual roles of JCP and WP providers. If a 
service user complains to JCP about their experience they will be referred to the 
provider. If the complaint is about JCP and the provider JCP will lead the response to 
the complaint. If the complaint is about WP policy then the provider should refer the 
complaint to JCP.  
 
DWP guidance for providers further indicates that if a dispute between an individual 
and a prime or subcontractor cannot be resolved then the case should be referred to 
DWP’s ‘Independent Complaints Examiner’ (ICE). If the dispute cannot be resolved 
through mediation ICE will conduct a formal investigation which may incur a £5,000 
fee for the prime or subcontractor. The ICE decision will be ‘final’ and a provider may 
also have to pay any financial redress recommended. If dissatisfied an individual 
service user can, in the case of maladministration, take their case further to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman.  
 
Prime providers must produce a document outlining their minimum services and the 
‘first steps’ of their complaints procedures but it is unclear how the full range of 
safeguards are being communicated to service users. Moreover there does not 
seem to be any mechanism for collating complaints information between JCP, prime 
contractors and DWP.   
 
There appears to be a lack of clarity and clear lines of responsibility in handling and 
resolving complaints about WP service delivery have yet to be established. There 
also appears to be no mechanism for collating complaints information between JCP, 
prime providers and DWP.   
 
3.8 WP providers and non-profit organisations 
 
Concerns have been expressed about how prime providers may manage their 
subcontractors and the contractual terms and risks that are being passed on to 
smaller organisations. In response DWP’s Commissioning Strategy established a 
‘code of conduct’ to guide the management of such relationships and Government 
Ministers have placed particular emphasis on the role to be played by third sector, 
voluntary and specialist non-profit organisations in delivering the WP. The 
Department stresses prime contractor responsibility to develop ‘healthy’ supply 
chains, but eschews any direct involvement in supply chain practices indicating that 
these are commercial relationships between the prime and their subcontractors. 
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There has been a significant, and unique, response in DWPs sponsorship of the 
‘Merlin Standard’ with prime providers expected to be compliant with this ‘standard of 
excellence in subcontractor management’ within a year of being awarded a contract. 
‘Merlin’ is an independent, industry-led accreditation process that, it is anticipated, 
will shape and share best practices in relationships between primes and 
subcontractors. In the event of non-compliance DWP may deploy various sanctions 
and if disputes arise between a prime and a subcontractor the process provides for a 
mediation process (also to be delivered by DWP’s Independent Case Examiner). 
The efficacy of such self regulation has yet to be tested and it is not yet clear how 
much of a contribution this process will make to generating insight into and 
knowledge of WP supply chain dynamics.  
 
Over time it may be important to monitor the impact that WP contracting has on the 
composition of the non-profit organisations involved as well as on the number, terms 
and value of any contracts with primes. Concerns have been expressed that larger 
non-profits are more likely to benefit under the new contractual arrangements and 
there is some evidence for this from Australia and the USA. In both countries large 
non-profit providers, such as Goodwill Industries, and the employment service 
organisations established by large religious denominations, such as the Salvation 
Army,  have acquired a leading role in delivering contracted out employment 
services. Smaller secular voluntary and community organisations have fared far less 
well, albeit innovative collaborative structures, including a social franchise in 
Australia, have enabled specialist and community organisations to win and deliver 
contracts in both countries.  
 
Another development in the countries reviewed, has been the emergence of 
providers as a distinct interest group and a more powerful lobbying force. In GB 
many providers now are organised in the ‘Employment Related Services Association’ 
and ‘Association of Employment and Learning Providers’ but it is WP prime 
contractors that are likely to have easier direct access to senior civil servants and 
Ministers. The interactions between primes and officials will take place now within 
the wider context of the influence and lobbying power of the larger for-profit 
organisations that hold WP contracts.  
 
3.9 Accountability and oversight 
 
The accountability of WP providers is more limited than that of public sector 
organisations. They are subject to the normal legal requirements that apply to all 
private companies and charities but there are differences concerning the 
accountability of private contractors to Parliamentary Committees, audit authorities, 
the Human Rights Act (1998), and they may be beyond the scope of the 
Ombudsman.  WP contracts have been published but information that was 
considered ‘commercially sensitive or confidential’ has been redacted. There is little 
public information available on the design and content of subcontractor contracts. 
 
Contracting out of employment services poses challenges for political accountability. 
Ministers remain politically responsible for service outcomes and the effective use of 
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public funds even though in practice they will have less control over the actions of 
WP contractors and more limited means of intervening in their activities. There is 
considerable scope for ‘blame shifting’ and the responsibility for poor performance is 
less obvious. In each of the comparator countries audit and oversight bodies have 
played a significant role in holding policy makers and providers to account, 
prompting improvements in service delivery, and exposing poor practices. In this 
context the role of such bodies in Britain will be of particular importance, especially 
as Ministers, senior officials and providers have a clear interest in promoting the 
success of the WP. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Experience from other countries, and from Britain, suggests that the advantages to 
be gained from the WP come with risks and that these need to be monitored and 
managed over the contract period. The Public Accounts Committee and other 
oversight bodies will have a key role to play in assessing market formation, service 
delivery, impacts and cost effectiveness, and in giving DWP and WP providers 
critical feedback that will allow future lessons to be learned and necessary 
programme or contractual adjustments made. 
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